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Proceedings from the 2016 NSF–Sloan Workshop on Practical Privacy 
Abstract 
On October 14, 2016, we hosted a workshop that brought together economists, survey statisticians, and 
computer scientists with expertise in the field of privacy preserving methods: Census Bureau staff 
working on implementing cutting-edge methods in the Bureau’s flagship public-use products mingled with 
academic researchers from a variety of universities. The four products discussed as part of the workshop 
were 1. the American Community Survey (ACS); 2. Longitudinal Employer-Household Data (LEHD), in 
particular the LEHD Origin-Destination Employment Statistics (LODES); the 3. 2020 Decennial Census; and 
the 4. 2017 Economic Census. The goal of the workshop was to 1. Discuss the specific challenges that 
have arisen in ongoing efforts to apply formal privacy models to Census data products by drawing 
together expertise of academic and governmental researchers 2. Produce short written memos that 
summarize concrete suggestions for practical applications to specific Census Bureau priority areas. 
Comments 
Funding for the workshop was provided by the National Science Foundation (CNS-1012593) and the 
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Organizational support was provided by the Research and Methodology 
Directorate at the U.S. Census Bureau and the Labor Dynamics Institute at Cornell University. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ldi/33 
  
 
 
Proceedings from the 
NSF–Sloan Workshop 
on Practical Privacy 
Held on Friday October 14, 2016 in 
Washington DC 
 
 
 
 
Lars Vilhuber and Ian M. Schmutte, Editors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Funding for the workshop was provided by the National Science 
Foundation (CNS-1012593) and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. 
Organizational support was provided by the Research and Methodology 
Directorate at the U.S. Census Bureau and the Labor Dynamics Institute 
at Cornell University.  
  
 
NSF-Sloan Workshop on Practical Privacy Version: 2017-05-07 Final2 
Funding through NSF CNS-1012593 and Sloan Foundation.  Page 1 
 
Table of Contents 
Disclaimer2 
Goals and Methods of the Workshop3 
Common Threads4 
Next steps4 
References5 
American Community Survey6 
Summary of Data Product6 
Summary of Discussion7 
References9 
LEHD Origin-Destination Employment Statistics (LODES)10 
Summary of Data Product and Context10 
Summary of Discussion10 
Challenges For the Future12 
References12 
2020 Decennial Census13 
Summary of data product and context13 
Summary of discussion13 
References16 
2017 Economic Census17 
Summary of Data Product17 
Summary of Discussion17 
Synthetic data generation project for 2017 EC18 
Miscellaneous19 
References19 
Appendix20 
Agenda for the October 14, 2016 workshop20 
Participants21 
 
 
  
 
NSF-Sloan Workshop on Practical Privacy Version: 2017-05-07 Final2 
Funding through NSF CNS-1012593 and Sloan Foundation.  Page 2 
 
  
Disclaimer 
Many of the participants of this workshop are employees or contractors of the U.S. Census Bureau. The 
opinions, discussions, and conclusions reported in these proceedings are those of the participants and do 
not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau, the National Science Foundation, or the 
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. This document has not undergone the review accorded Census Bureau 
publications and no endorsement should be inferred. While many participants contributed their notes to 
the summaries, all final editing was done by the editors. All results have been reviewed to ensure that no 
confidential information is disclosed.  
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Goals and Methods of the Workshop 
Lars Vilhuber and Ian M. Schmutte 
Protecting the privacy of respondents, whether they may be individual people or companies, while at 
the same time providing useful and meaningful statistics, are two competing goals to which statistical 
agencies devote considerable effort. With the recent surge in new methods, triggered in part by the 
growing interest in differential privacy (Dwork et al. 2006), old ways of "doing things" are being 
questioned, and yet new methods are almost never drop-in replacements. Even when the theory has 
been fully mapped out, and algorithms abound (Dwork and Roth 2014), translating theory into functional, 
repeatable, scalable, and accepted practices for providing real data is rare (Machanavajjhala et al. 2008). 
On October 14, 2016, we hosted a workshop that brought together economists, survey statisticians, 
and computer scientists with expertise in the field of privacy preserving methods: Census Bureau staff 
working on implementing cutting-edge methods in the Bureau’s flagship public-use products mingled with 
academic researchers from a variety of universities. The four products discussed as part of the workshop 
were 
1. the American Community Survey (ACS); 
2. Longitudinal Employer-Household Data (LEHD), in particular the LEHD Origin-Destination 
Employment Statistics (LODES); the 
3. 2020 Decennial Census; and the 
4. 2017 Economic Census. 
The goal of the workshop was to  
1. Discuss the specific challenges that have arisen in ongoing efforts to apply formal privacy 
models to Census data products by drawing together expertise of academic and 
governmental researchers 
2. Produce short written memos that summarize concrete suggestions for practical applications 
to specific Census Bureau priority areas. 
We formed two break-out groups in each of two sessions. Each group had 2 hours to discuss the 
issues surrounding a particular data product. Allocation to each group was not random: at least one 
Census Bureau product or team lead provided an overview of the characteristics of the product, the 
issues being faced in regards to disclosure avoidance, and ongoing efforts to address them. The entire 
group was free to discuss any aspect of theory, implementation, etc. No conclusion needed to be 
reached.  
A consensus summary of the discussion was compiled by note takers in the group, and was 
presented to the plenum midway through the workshop, and before the end of the workshop. The note 
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takers then drafted a summary, which was subsequently circulated among the group members for review 
and correction. The final summary appears in these proceedings.  
Common Threads 
A few common threads appear throughout the discussions on new disclosure avoidance techniques. 
First, the technological challenges: existing data structures differ widely. The difficulties in applying new 
disclosure protection mechanisms are compounded by the variety of data being collected, from the 
language spoken in a household as reported by a person (American Community Survey), to the 
presumed location of a worker's economic activity as reported by an employer (LEHD), to the quantity 
and cost of consumed polyester for the production of broadwoven fabrics (one part of the Economic 
Census). Existing data consumers, the stakeholders in the data production exercise, expect continuity 
inthe quality and diversity of statistics that they have obtained in the past. Legal requirements restrict 
where disclosure avoidance can bite. For instance, the U.S. Congress has dictated that the population 
counts (in total, and for age groups over and under 18) derived from the Decennial Census must be 
accurate at the state and national levels. As of this writing, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests 
on government workers can constrain the amount of privacy protection that can be afforded to individuals 
who at some point were in the employment of the U.S. federal government in tables generated from the 
LEHD infrastructure.  
These constraints on how the data are produced, who they are produced for, and the legal 
framework surrounding those issues, are non-trivial complications of an already quite complicated 
endeavor. 
Another significant commonality across all groups is the expressed need to measure uses of the 
data. Historically, many tabulations have been created in a comprehensive and exhaustive measure, yet 
many of those tabulations may never be used. A better assessment of which (past and potential future) 
queries are of primary interest is a key need for all groups.  
Finally, it was noted in all groups that a particular challenge is the protection of hierarchically 
structured data. Whether it be workers within employers (LEHD), or individuals as parts of households 
(ACS and Decennial Census), or products within firms (Economic Census), this feature of many social 
datasets is absent from much of the newer literature on formally private systems, and is considered a key 
challenge to be addressed by the scientific community. 
Next steps 
The members of the various teams have expressed an interest to continue discussing these topics in 
these workshops. A follow-on workshop is planned for the Spring of 2017.  
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American Community Survey 
Based on notes prepared by Amy Lauger, William Sexton, and Lars Vilhuber 
Summary of Data Product 
The American Community Survey (ACS) is the successor to the prior long form of the Decennial 
Census of Population and Housing. The housing unit survey includes 24 housing and household 
questions and 48 person-level demographic questions about a broad range of topics. There is a separate 
questionnaire for those residing in group quarters (U.S. Census Bureau 2014). ACS produces about 11 
billion tabular summaries. The survey is sent to approximately 3.5 million housing units each year and we 
collect about 2.5 million responses after nonresponse, etc. Weighting adjustments are made to account 
for nonresponse, in-person interview subsampling, and raking to population controls. The ACS sample is 
usually selected at the tract level and is designed to allow reliable inferences for small geographic areas 
and for subpopulations. Tracts are designed to have a population of around 4000 people, and ACS 
sampling rates vary across tracts. However, on average, a tract will have approximately 35 housing units 
and 90 people in the returned sample. 
The Census Bureau releases one-year and five-year ACS data products. Five-year tables are 
released either by block group or by tract while historically one-year tables have been released only for 
geographies containing at least 65,000 people. A recent decision has allowed some tables to be released 
for areas of at least 20,000, due to the termination of the three-year data products. 
From web site tracking, the ACS staff have some data indicating demand for the tables. Selected 
economic characteristics and ACS demographic tables are requested over two million times per year. 
However, the majority of public tables are never requested.  
Currently, the main disclosure avoidance methods for the official estimates include data swapping for 
the household population and data synthesis for the group quarters population. Some noise is added in 
certain cases (Lauger, Wisniewski, and McKenna 2014). A major drawback of data swapping is that there 
is no known way of quantifying its privacy guarantee. 
In addition to the tables, the Census Bureau releases Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS)1. 
Additional disclosure avoidance methods for these files currently include: 
1. Limiting geographic detail to areas with a population of 100,000 
2. Categorical variable coarsening 
3. Topcoding 
 
                                                     
1  See also http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/technical-documentation.html  
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The current research into improved disclosure avoidance (DA) techniques, led by Jerry Reiter (Duke 
University), is considering both synthetic data and formally private data.  
Summary of Discussion 
The team is concerned about the feasibility of developing formally private protection mechanisms 
given current methodological and computational constraints and the large number of ACS variables. The 
creation of synthetic data is a backup option that would allow the replacement the current DA methods, 
which don’t allow for any provable quantification of privacy protection or transparency about the effects on 
data quality. 
It was noted in the discussion that it is not the research team's job to set the privacy budget but 
rather to describe the utility/privacy frontier to the decision makers.  
The main challenges were described as: 
1. High dimensionality: around 200 topical variables 
2. Geography 
3. Within-household relationships 
4. Outliers in economic variables 
5. Protect tables directly or create microdata and produce tables from there? 
6. One-year vs five-year data products? 
The main disclosure challenges stem from high-dimensionality combined with small sample sizes. 
Small geographies and sub-populations are important for key uses of the ACS: Tract-level data, and even 
block group-level data are critical for many data users. These data have very high error rates. However, 
users often use these geographies as building blocks to create local areas according to their own salient 
definitions, that in aggregate have more acceptable error rates. Also, many special geographies 
published by the Census Bureau, including cities, school districts, etc., are dependent upon tracts and 
block groups. 
Given the small sample sizes at the tract level, the team assumes that tract may be the lowest level 
feasible for modeling, and even that might be tricky. However, many 5- year ACS estimates are published 
at the block group level. The team hasn’t determined yet if and how estimates at that level can be 
provided. 
The team is collecting metrics on which data are requested most often. Those metrics, and 
collaboration with the analysts in other directorates, will help inform which relationships are most 
important to maintain.  
Editing and imputation is used to clean the data. The specs for the edit and imputation processes are 
thousands of pages long. The team believes that incorporating editing and imputation into the DA 
systems is infeasible at this stage. For now, the team will start with the edited data, and will consider if 
edit must be rerun post-DA. 
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The large margins of error for small geographies allow for some scope for introducing error from DA 
without significantly increasing total survey error. Modeling can introduce some bias for massive 
decreases in variance by borrowing strength from correlations. We need to think about all of this from a 
total survey error perspective, where the error includes that introduced from sampling, edits, 
nonresponse, disclosure, etc. 
John Abowd indicated that Census Bureau officials are highly concerned about PUMS files right 
now. The ACS team will need to consider phasing in improvements as they are ready instead of waiting 
to implement all changes at once. 
The research team is currently considering the following approach: 
1. Build a chain of models, synthesizing each variable successively given the previously 
synthesized variables (Raghunathan et al. 2001) 
2. Build formally private version of those models, if feasible 
3. Create microdata samples from these models 
4. Create tables from these microdata samples 
John Abowd commented that this approach does not take advantage of correlations in tables. 
Preventing p-hacking is an added bonus of differential privacy methods. We wish to provide 
researchers with enough information to make valid inferences but can't support all possible analysis due 
to budget limitations. It will be necessary to explicitly acknowledge whose data interests are most favored. 
This is part of the previously mentioned transparency.  
Maintaining within-household relationships was briefly mentioned this as a problem. Examples given: 
1. A biological daughter cannot be older than her father 
2. Within household clustering, for example, by race 
The group did not discuss solutions. 
Jerry Reiter mentioned concern for outliers in variables such as property value and income. 
However, there is some protection from extreme outliers in that the ACS only collects data up to a certain 
level of precision. We should model outliers independent of the real data. The RDCs will be the solution 
for research questions for which this leads to unacceptable data usefulness. 
The group briefly discussed the role of weights. Survey weights can themselves add disclosure risk. 
The current plan is to build a synthetic dataset that replicates the ACS sample, not the population. Then 
weights will be created.  
The group only briefly discussed time levels for aggregation and protection. Options are either 
creation of 5-year releases with overlap, or 1-year released that are then combined to 5-year averages 
afterwards. Overlap between 5-year tables may result in strange temporal bias issues. 
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Chris Clifton suggested that publishing this list of challenges is in itself a good exercise. It may 
encourage other academics to work on these problems. The group suggested various journals 
(Challenge, Chance, Science) and various differential privacy workshops. 
The group indicated that outside researchers cannot work on the problem without access to the right 
data and discussed whether the PUMS would be a good starting point. The PUMS files could be altered 
to simulate various aspects like smaller geographies and outliers, etc. Some believed this would be a 
feasible place to start while others felt they were not, given that they are already privacy protected. Others 
suggested a completely simulated microdata file assuming uniform distributions. 
Jerry Reiter summarized that the PUMS or some variation of the PUMS favors inferences about data 
usefulness while a simulated dataset favors inferences about privacy. 
John Abowd suggested that the ACS team prioritize figuring out how to model data nationally in an 
accurate and parsimonious way and then determine how to get to lower areas. The team should 
determine where it does well and doesn’t do well. He also suggested that an ideal tool would be a tunable 
workload assessor, so a stakeholder can decide what aspects are most important, while keeping 
algorithm development and policy decisions separate. Order matters with privacy budgets. John Abowd 
gave the example of Decennial Census redistricting files being published first, and the resulting need to 
ensure that those stakeholders don’t eat up the privacy budget before other stakeholders get their 
relevant files. Dan Kifer suggested giving each stakeholder a certain epsilon and it’s up to him to decide 
how to use it. When they’ve exhausted it, they will need to rely on data other stakeholders chose to get.  
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LEHD Origin-Destination Employment 
Statistics (LODES) 
Based on notes prepared by Matthew Graham, Vishesh Karwa, and Lars Vilhuber 
Summary of Data Product and Context 
LEHD Origin-Destination Employment Statistics (LODES) is a partially synthetic dataset that 
describes geographic patterns of jobs by their employment locations and residential locations as well as 
the connections between the two locations (U.S. Census Bureau 2016). A job is counted if a worker is 
employed with positive earnings during the reference quarter as well as in the quarter prior to the 
reference quarter. These data and marginal summaries are tabulated by several categorical variables. 
The origin-destination (OD) matrix is made available by 10 different “labor market segments.” The area 
characteristic (AC) data – summary margins by residence block and workplace block – contain additional 
variables including age, earnings, and industry. The blocks are defined in terms of 2010 census blocks, 
defined for the 2010 Decennial Census. The input data is a linked employer-employee dataset, and 
statistics on the workplaces (Quarterly Workforce Indicators, QWI) are protected using noise infusion 
together with primary suppression (Abowd et al. 2009; Abowd et al. 2012). For OnTheMap and the 
underlying LODES data, the protection of the residential addresses of the workers is achieved using a 
formal privacy model (Machanavajjhala et al. 2008). The two protection mechanisms are independent of 
each other. The data is hierarchical (workers work for employers), but can be visualized as stemming 
from an evolving bipartite graph.  
The current challenge is to build a formal privacy model that protects both residences and 
workplaces.  
Summary of Discussion 
The discussion started with a brief discussion about the need to protect. Why are businesses (in 
LODES, and other Census products) protected as they are? Since U.S.C. Title 13 is not very precise, 
there is room for interpretation, and the question revolved around the regulatory and historical reasons for 
the type of protection mechanism chosen. The answer was primarily that historical precedent guides 
current practice. Business X's location and type (industry classification) are observable and not subject to 
protection, but characteristics of the operation of the business, and of its employees, are protected. On 
the residential side, all characteristics, including location, are protected. 
Part of the discussion revolved around the intrinsic longitudinal aspect of the underlying data, and its 
effect on both protection and publication. The current QWI publications protect cross-sectional 
characteristics of firms' operations, but do not protect longitudinal aspects thereof (e.g., job creation). 
LODES statistics are based on a single cross-section each year, are not revised, but draw new noise 
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every year. This potentially adds a lot of noise, and may be inefficient. However, current research has not 
found a satisfactory answer, and it is viewed as an open research question how to properly do 
longitudinal protection.  
Much time was spent on attempting to understand the query workload, aka the public's need for 
data. All possible tabulations are produced, and protected, potentially expending privacy budget (in a 
vague sense) without corresponding use. What parts of the overall tabulations are actually used by data 
users? Could a reduced set be produced, discarding unused tabulations, and achieving better accuracy in 
released tabulations with the same overall protection ("privacy budget"). The core data are available as 
flat CSV files available for anonymous download, yielding it nearly impossible to assess actual usage of 
all tabulations. However, the Census Bureau has started measuring usage in its user-friendly download 
interfaces: LED Extraction Tool2, QWI Explorer3 (both for QWI), and OnTheMap4. Census personnel 
noted that quite a lot of queries stem from automated tools that use non-traditional geographic (free-form) 
queries, which cannot be classified by traditional Census geography. These are driven by tools like 
OnTheMap for Emergency Management5, though they do not necessarily derive from user needs. 
Researchers have in the past attempted to analyze the query logs, without great success so far, but it is 
seen as a critical and important open task. It was noted, however, that past queries are not necessarily a 
good indicator of future queries, and any mechanism that takes into account past queries must also have 
a mechanism to accommodate future unanticipated queries. A side question briefly explored to what 
extent query logs are themselves confidential. 
Other than the simple usage statistics, the question was asked how utility was measured for LODES. 
The three metrics (L1 error, errors in ranking queries, and fractional error) were outlined 
(Machanavajjhala et al. 2008; Haney et al. 2017). 
A related question referred to the reporting of margins of error. Generically, input data error (non-
survey error) are known to swamp protection errors (unpublished statistics by Abowd et al). It was noted 
that this might reduce the need for protection if the system were integrated, which it is not. The error from 
all imputation methods (unit-to-worker imputation, imputation of demographic characteristics, imputation 
of firm characteristics, see Abowd et al., 2009) is not taken into account when computing the protection. It 
was noted however that most of the imputation models used are multiple imputation models, and 
composition (the ability to combine the imputation and protection mechanisms) is difficult and an unsolved 
problem, with much of the theoretical work still missing. 
One feature that was highlighted as an efficient use of the privacy budget. In some rare cases, data 
were revised (due to improvements of the underlying data), and it was feasible to resynthesize only the 
                                                     
2  https://ledextract.ces.census.gov/ 
3  https://qwiexplorer.ces.census.gov/  
4  https://onthemap.ces.census.gov/  
5  https://onthemap.ces.census.gov/em/  
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affected (small) area, and a new 𝜀 computed only for that area. This does compose, and the impact on 
the overall privacy budget can be computed, and is small.  
Challenges For the Future 
1. Computing and reporting of margin of error 
2. Improved mechanisms for updating Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) 
Program data 
3. Revising the protection mechanism for residential data, and integrating with workplace 
protection 
4. Adapting protection mechanism to workload 
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2020 Decennial Census 
Based on notes prepared by William Sexton, Phil Leclerc, and Lars Vilhuber 
Summary of data product and context 
The 2020 Decennial Census is the next constitutionally mandated count of the US population. An 
exact count of the population is required for the proper apportionment of the US House of 
Representatives. Data from the census is also used in the distribution of federal funds to local 
communities. The census consists of 10 questions, and requires the enumeration of all persons living in a 
given domicile, collecting data on demographic characteristics (age, sex, ethnicity, race), and information 
about ownership of the domicile.6 
Once collected, summaries of the raw data are produced. Summary File 1 (SF1) contains population 
tables, housing tables, and geographic tables of the data collected from the Decennial Census (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2012). The Decennial Census yields tables for each of the 50 states, District of Columbia, 
Puerto Rico, and the United States. The Public Law 94-171 (PL94) Census Redistricting Data Summary 
File is a particularly important subset of SF1. Congress has dictated that the population counts (total, 
under 18, over 18) in these tables must be accurate at the state and national levels. For missing data, 
Bureau of Commerce policy dictates that the Decennial Census use hot-deck imputation. Any privacy 
measures must respect these stipulations. 
The discussion focused on research efforts underway to implement a formally private confidentiality 
protection system. The goal of this system is to produce publicly usable, simulated microdata sets 
(PUMS), and to provide formally private, accurate answers to the “most important” subset(s) of the 
Summary File tables7, with particular attention paid to the PL94 tabulations. 
Summary of discussion 
Key challenges that were highlighted include:  
1. ensuring consistency 
2. respecting joins and answering nonlinear queries 
3. large memory/time requirements for explicitly stored universes, and well-understood low-
dimensional approximations may either approximate poorly or complicate update rules 
4. difficulty detecting coding errors, particularly as pertains to verifying privacy guarantees 
5. communicating analytic results clearly to and in a format useful for policy makers 
6. a lack of high-quality usage data from which to infer relative priority of data products 
                                                     
6  For more information, see http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/2020-census/about.html. 
7  Note that it is not clear a priori whether separate budgets should be used for the PUMS and tabular answers, or if the PUMS 
should only reflect the information used to construct the tabular answers.  
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7. determining how much of the privacy budget (ε) should be spent per household (e.g. 
proportional to house size?) 
The team conducting this research is led by Dan Kifer. They are experimenting, similarly to the ACS 
team, with the Multiplicative Weights Exponential Mechanism (MWEM) (Dwork and Roth 2014; Hardt, 
Ligett, and McSherry 2012), which produces differentially private tabular summaries of underlying 
microdata.  
Some participants expect, based on prior experience with MWEM, that the formally private system 
may produce less accurate data than the traditional statistical disclosure limitation techniques (e.g. 
swapping, additive/multiplicative noise, cell suppression) currently in use to generate the tables in SF1. 
Others pointed out that due to the lack of formal description of the extent of protection in current systems, 
such as swapping, make that conclusion less robust. Reduced data quality is a ‘hard sell’ for the Census 
Bureau’s policy leadership. If formally private data is systematically inconsistent, heavily biased, or 
sufficiently noisy in ways that break down frequently used statistical machinery, many stakeholders in the 
use of Census Bureau data will be unhappy.  
A particular challenge is the hierarchical structure of the Decennial data: Households are sampled, 
and within households, data on individuals is collected. These two levels must remain consistent even in 
the protected data: for instance, in the synthesized data, children must not be older than the parents, 
within the same household. Thus data consistency is a major concern in the implementation of formally 
private Decennial Census data releases.8  
The group acknowledged the complexity of the Census Bureau’s process for cleaning the raw data 
to generate the gold standard files, and that this process is in principle affects the privacy system. At 
present the research team is not formally addressing this issue (they are treating the gold standard files 
as “truth”). However, in this context, Kobbi Nissim mentioned that a technique known as “privacy 
amplification” may be useful in using sampling variance to gain extra privacy ‘for free’ in a PUMS. 
The group also discussed criteria by which to evaluate the quality of formally private data relative to 
that produced using Census’ traditional SDL methods. To provide basic benchmarks, we can use either 
the simple, workload-based Laplace mechanism or a uniformly distributed PUMS to provide “sanity 
checks” on the quality of more sophisticated methods. More sophisticated comparisons are also possible; 
we might, for example, seek to compare and contrast a differentially private 2020 Census with a k-
anonymity-protected 2020 Census, although comparisons of this kind are fraught with technical issues 
(e.g., how do we choose ε and k to standardize this comparison appropriately?). Use of the PL94 
Summary Files to conduct redistricting suggests that some reasonable, automated metrics might be 
generated by considering the impact of a formally private mechanism on districts generated using 
standard district-determination models/algorithms from the political science literature. We may also 
                                                     
8  The geography-level records in the public use files (block, tract, etc.) pose an entirely different challenge: being in significant part 
computed directly from the raw data, they are currently considered out-of-scope for the formal privacy project, but their release 
procedure is not formally private. 
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consider comparing and contrasting formally private data products from the 2020 Census to data from the 
2010 Census and to recent iterations of the American Community Survey, since changes relative to these 
earlier data products will be important for many common uses of 2020 Census data. Lastly, differential 
privacy might be motivated from an axiomatic framework, possibly rooted in analysis of relevant 
Constitutional or Congressional mandates, legal statues, best practices of national statistical agencies, 
and past precedent. Harvard University's Privacy Tools Project is working to development an axiomatic 
framework in this spirit (Wood 2016). Some important axioms for privacy mechanisms have also been 
discussed briefly in the literature; "Pufferfish" (Kifer and Machanavajjhala 2014) describes a few such 
axioms (Transformation Invariance, Convexity), for example. A key theme of this discussion is that 
simple, standard metrics (e.g. L1/L2 error) are not likely to mirror real-world utility very well, and may 
generate unwanted artifacts9 in the simulated microdata. 
When using the Multiplicative Weights Exponential Mechanism (MWEM) (Dwork and Roth 2014; 
Hardt, Ligett, and McSherry 2012) to answer queries, memory is a big hurdle when the universe of record 
types is high dimensional. The idea is to first create synthetic Decennial Census data via MWEM to get 
accuracy without an embarrassingly high ε, and then iteratively fit to publicly known statistics in order to 
improve the initial synthetic microdata. Dan Kifer's group at the Census Bureau is currently working on 
this approach. The current plan is to start simulating data at the national level, fix things that look bad, 
then move to the state level (focusing on states whose data differ starkly from the national data), and so 
on. Starting low and propagating up is ill advised due to resulting error expansion.  
There was a suggestion to look at the mostly abandoned literature in controlled rounding as a post-
processing tool to achieve consistency after generating tables. Such a technique might be used for 
ensuring consistency with publicly known statistics or to respect the Census Bureau’s large collection of 
structural zeroes/“edits” (e.g. a daughter may not be older than her father). As an alternative to controlled 
rounding, it was suggested that a mixture model technique can achieve a low-dimensional representation 
of high-dimensional data and will place zero probability on structural zero queries, but this approach tends 
to badly over-estimate some multivariate statistics. Furthermore, although structural zeroes might appear 
to be useful for reducing the data universe size (one of our other major problems), discussants noted that 
reducing the size of the universe by removing all structural zeroes is a coding nightmare and unlikely to 
be sufficient to solve the memory problem.  
Although we lack detailed, high-quality usage statistics, at a high level there is a clear priority 
ordering of table accuracy requirements: PL94 must be the most accurate (with exact counts for the 
previously indicated quantities), the remaining tables of SF1 are of secondary priority, and the large 
number of remaining SF2 tables are of tertiary importance. It is worthwhile to note we must accept 
                                                     
9  More strongly, it was suggested that simulated microdata may contain unusual artifacts (e.g. many regions of implausible 
uniformity) generally, and that these may be problematic for social scientists investigating PUMS generated with differentially 
private mechanisms. 
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whatever privacy loss is incurred through the publication of PL94 population counts due to the 
Congressional mandate that these be exact. 
While considering how to motivate differentially private mechanisms for policy makers, there was a 
short discussion about what impact an explanation of privacy measures might have on response rates 
and response accuracy. The key idea here was that, if respondents knew that more stringent privacy 
methods were in use than for prior censuses, response rates and accuracy might increase as a result, 
and this improvement might help ease some of the likely policy costs of a formally private approach (e.g. 
increased noise variance due to disclosure limitation techniques). However, implementing a field test of 
this idea seems unlikely, so the topic was dropped from discussion. 
Returning to our earlier note that debugging is likely to be quite difficult, it was noted that it is difficult 
to write automated tests for verifying that a given algorithm correctly guarantees some given level of 
differential privacy (or differential privacy at any level). We should be able to test for some common 
mistakes (e.g. an unintentionally inverted Laplace parameter) and well-known side channel attacks (e.g. 
privacy loss due to truncation), but general side-channel attacks are difficult to anticipate and address. 
Both bugs and side-channel attacks can erode privacy guarantees, so broader verification of the code is 
important. A code-vetting/ bug-catching/ algorithm critique and/or development contest (run independent 
of the Census Bureau, e.g. by a university, due to legal concerns) might help to engage the broader 
community of privacy experts in addressing our major challenges. The 2020 Census timeline must be 
kept in mind in considering when such a contest might be held. Our central goal is to have code ready for 
end-to-end test of census disclosure by 2018. The R&M Directorate could then push for an official release 
of code for vetting prior to 2020.  
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2017 Economic Census 
Based on notes prepared by Scot Dahl, Hang Kim, Jenny Thompson, and Lars Vilhuber 
Summary of Data Product 
The Economic Census is a census of businesses conducted every five years by the U.S. Census 
Bureau. Forms are sent out to nearly 4 million businesses, broadly representative of the complete U.S. 
geography and all industries, though some industries are excluded. Respondents are asked to 
operational and performance data,10 and their response is required by law. 
The economic census is primarily conducted on an establishment basis, where an establishment is 
defined for a location and activity. Companies are requested to file separate reports when operating at 
different locations, and when multiple lines of activity are present at a given location. The economic 
census is a mixture of a complete enumeration for certain types of businesses, and sampling of other 
types. 
The EC collects information from sampled establishments on the revenue obtained from product 
sales (hereafter referred to as “products”). In any given industry, establishments can report values from a 
wide variety of potential products. The reported product values are expected to sum to the total receipts 
reported earlier in the questionnaire. Often, product descriptions are quite detailed, and many products 
are mutually exclusive. Consequently, legitimate missing values occur frequently. Good predictors such 
as administrative data and other survey data are available for the general statistics variables, but auxiliary 
data are not available for the other items. 
In the 2017 EC, missing product data will be imputed using hot deck imputation (Thompson and Liu 
2015; Knutson and Martin 2015), and variance estimates for product totals will be published for the first 
time. Depending on the industry, random hot deck or nearest neighbor hot deck imputation will be 
implemented (Tolliver and Betchel 2015; Bechtel, Morris, and Thompson 2015). The variance estimator 
accounts for sampling variance, calibration weighting, and imputation variance. The imputation variance 
component is the most challenging to estimate, as composite imputation is employed for general statistics 
items (Shao and Steel 1999) and the imputation rates for several products is quite high. In addition, the 
highly stratified sample design makes it difficult to accurately estimate the sampling variance component. 
Summary of Discussion 
The key challenge are the changes happening in the 2017 EC (Economic Census): 
                                                     
10  For examples, see sample forms for MC-31303 Broadwoven Fabrics (https://bhs.econ.census.gov/ec12/mc-31-33/mc-31303-
form.html), MI-21101 Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction (https://bhs.econ.census.gov/ec12/mi-21/mi-21101-form.html), 
and RT-44101 Automobile Dealers (https://bhs.econ.census.gov/ec12/rt-44-45/rt-44101-form.html). 
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1. All electronic data collection 
2. Use of North American Product Classification System (NAPCS) 
3. New sample designs for some sectors (Manufacturing, Mining, and Construction) 
There was an initial discussion surrounding NAPCS and the American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS). The NAPCS classification procedure is a major departure from the current collection procedures 
which explicitly links product codes to industry. NAPCS will be introduced in the 2017 Economic Census 
(EC), and economy-wide product tabulations from cross-sector publications will be released for the first 
time. The group also briefly discussed EC data collection challenges. Some variables are obtained for all 
establishments (general statistics variables: receipts, payroll, employment, etc.), either through direct  
collection or administrative data substitution. Other data are collected only from sampled establishments.  
The key disclosure limitation challenge that the team will focus on is the disclosure limitation process 
for NAPCS (product) estimates, given the 2017 EC editing and imputation procedures. The current plan is 
to release product and product by industry tabulations that satisfy predetermined privacy and reliability 
constraints and to release supplemental synthetic industry-level microdata files, pending the outcome of 
the research discussed below. 
Synthetic data generation project for 2017 EC 
Beginning in 2017, the Center for Disclosure Avoidance Research (CDAR) is commissioning an 
interdisciplinary team led by Hang Kim (University of Cincinnati) to evaluate the feasibility of developing 
synthetic industry-level microdata comprising general statistics items and selected products. Specific 
products may differ by industry, and the level of model estimation (industry, industry by state) will need to 
be determined in the course of the research. 
Kim, Reiter, and Karr (2016) present methods of developing synthetic data that satisfies edit rules 
and disclosure constraints on historic EC data from the manufacturing sector. The team hopes to extend 
their multivariate normal joint model to accommodate these data sets, although other modifications or 
models may need to be investigated. For example, EC synthetic data has an additional constraint, 
specifically the preservation of published margins. The proposed methods allow for multiple imputation 
variance estimation; it has not been determined whether the multiple imputation variance estimates for 
the synthetic data will need to approximately match the published estimates.  
Besides developing usable datasets, there is an additional goal of teaching users to use synthetic 
data to produce their own tabulations and conduct their own analyses. The team thus needs to think 
about actual usage and analysis by outside users. How is confidence in the synthetic data created? One 
possibility is a verification server (Reiter, Oganian, and Karr 2009). 
The group also discussed the relative merits of fully synthetic vs. partially synthetic data. The 
advantages of fully synthetic data – consistent properties for all estimates, preferred by some users - are 
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weighed against the disadvantages – some outliers are synthesized too well and may pose a disclosure 
risk. 
Miscellaneous 
Quantification of data quality is generally difficult: it remains an open question whether one should 
rely on a priori, formal privacy guarantees (such as differential privacy), or ex post risk measures often 
used with a synthetic data approach (Kinney et al. 2011). 
References 
Bechtel, Laura T., Darcy Steeg Morris, and Katherine Jenny Thompson. 2015. “Using Classification Trees 
to Recommend Hot Deck Imputation Methods: A Case Study.” 
http://sites.usa.gov/fcsm/files/2016/03/E1_Bechtel_2015FCSM.pdf. 
Kim, Hang J., Jerome P. Reiter, and Alan F. Karr. 2016. “Simultaneous Edit-Imputation and Disclosure 
Limitation for Business Establishment Data.” Journal of Applied Statistics online: 1–20. 
Kinney, Satkartar K., Jerome P. Reiter, Arnold P. Reznek, Javier Miranda, Ron S. Jarmin, and John M. 
Abowd. 2011. “Towards Unrestricted Public Use Business Microdata: The Synthetic Longitudinal 
Business Database.” International Statistical Review = Revue Internationale de Statistique 79 (3). 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd: 362–84. 
Knutson, Jeremy, and Jared Martin. 2015. “Evaluation of Alternative Imputation Methods for Economic 
Census Products: The Cook-Off.” In Proceedings of the Section on Survey Research Methods, 
American Statistical Association. 
https://ww2.amstat.org/meetings/JSM/2015/onlineprogram/AbstractDetails.cfm?abstractid=315426. 
Reiter, Jerome P., Anna Oganian, and Alan F. Karr. 2009. “Verification Servers: Enabling Analysts to 
Assess the Quality of Inferences from Public Use Data.” Computational Statistics & Data Analysis 53 
(4): 1475–82. 
Shao, Jun, and Philip Steel. 1999. “Variance Estimation for Survey Data with Composite Imputation and 
Nonnegligible Sampling Fractions.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 94 (445). 
[American Statistical Association, Taylor & Francis, Ltd.]: 254–65. 
Thompson, Katherine Jennifer, and Xijian Liu. 2015. “On Recommending a Single Imputation Method for 
Economic Census Products.” In Proceedings of the Section on Government Statistics, American 
Statistical Association. 
https://ww2.amstat.org/meetings/jsm/2015/onlineprogram/AbstractDetails.cfm?abstractid=315412. 
Tolliver, Kevin, and Laura Betchel. 2015. “Implementation of Hot Deck Imputation on Economic Census 
Products.” In Proceedings of the Section on Survey Research Methods, American Statistical 
Association. 
https://ww2.amstat.org/meetings/jsm/2015/onlineprogram/AbstractDetails.cfm?abstractid=315511. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NSF-Sloan Workshop on Practical Privacy Version: 2017-05-07 Final2 
Funding through NSF CNS-1012593 and Sloan Foundation.  Page 20 
 
Appendix 
Agenda for the October 14, 2016 workshop 
Start Duration Topic Location 
8:30 (0h30) Welcome, housekeeping plan,  
Associate Director's remarks 
8h112 
9:00 (2h30) Break out working groups  
  (I) American Community Survey 8h112 
  (II) LODES B 
11:30 (0h30) Plenum - Interim summary 8h112 
12:00 (1h30) Lunch 8h112 
13:30 (2h30) Break out working groups  
  (III) Census 2020 8h112 
  (IV) Economic Census B 
16:00 (1h00) Plenum - Summary 8h112 
17:00  End of workshop  
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